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Introduction
The title of this paper and the lecture on which it is
based refer to the ethics ‘challenge’. Before I go
on to explore what I mean by this, I would like to
begin by noting one challenge that faces me: there
tends to be an expectation that anyone who dares
to speak or write on ethics should be ethical. I
don’t wish to make any special claims here, but
perhaps those on the receiving end of expositions
on ethics often have in mind the old adage ‘prac-
tise what you preach’. I suppose that, to the degree
that academics are more than mere observers or
detached analysts, to the degree that we hold forth
on what should be done, we lay ourselves open to
a special requirement to be ethical. However, for
very particular reasons that will become clear
below,1 I will attempt to keep my ‘preaching’ to a
minimum.
Another feature of what I am doing is that I will
attempt to cover quite a lot of ground, more than
might be the case in a conventional academic
paper. Part of the reason for that is that, when in-
vited to give the P.D. Leake Lecture, I was encour-
aged not to focus on financial reporting and audit
– which is where so much of the public debate
about accounting ethics tends to concentrate – but
to look at ethics in a way that might be relevant to
all members of the profession. After all, one of the
notable features of the British accountancy profes-
sion is the variety of roles its members occupy,
particularly as – for various reasons – accountancy
has served as a general management qualification
in the UK (Armstrong, 1987; Matthews et al.,
1998). One of my tasks, inter alia, will therefore be
to review some aspects of the general business
ethics literature in a way that might be of interest
to accountants and relevant to their thinking about
ethics.
In roundtable discussions with Chartered
Accountants2 during the preparation for the lec-
ture, two questions addressed in the business
ethics literature seemed to stand out. First, does
being ethical pay? In other words, what are the fi-
nancial consequences of taking an ethical stance?
Second, are codes of ethics an effective means of
promoting ethical behaviour? I shall address both
these questions in due course, but I shall situate
them in the context of an argument to be devel-
oped through the paper.
Because of my brief to look beyond financial re-
porting and auditing, my starting point will not be
the familiar ‘scandals’ of Enron, WorldCom,
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Parmalat and the like – which, it might be contend-
ed, have little to do with the UK profession, even
if it has felt the backwash from them – but rather
the question of what it means to be a profession.
Not only is this relevant to all qualified account-
ants and those with an interest in their activities,
but it also provides a good starting point for con-
sidering ethics, which for many people today
seems a rather vague and slippery matter.3 I am
therefore going to look at what I call ‘the profes-
sional challenge’, which will be the first of three
challenges within the overall ‘ethics challenge’.4
The professional challenge
My starting assumption is that professional ethics
matter. How much and in what ways, I will consid-
er below, but I take it as given that the claims of
professions and their members to act ethically – or,
rather, the degree to which they fulfil them – have
an impact on society. This is why, though scandals
may come and go, ethics is a standing challenge to
professions. It is important for professions to think
about ethics not only in times of turbulence, or
moral panic indeed, but in times of relative calm
too. Ethics is, or should be, an everyday feature of
professional life, and not just – or even – about
preventing major misdemeanours.5
Consider two classic professions – medicine and
the law – with which accountants have traditional-
ly compared themselves (Macdonald, 1984, 1995).
What if doctors were just in it for what they could
get, taking advantage of sick and vulnerable pa-
tients in their hour of need? Or what if lawyers
cared only about money, not their clients? Perhaps
you think the second example a poor one;6 in
which case you are possibly in agreement with a
widespread view that professions – to use George
Bernard Shaw’s memorable phrase – are ‘a con-
spiracy against the laity’. If so, that at least sup-
ports my point that professions and professional
ethics (or lack of them) matter. On the other hand,
if you think that, even if (say) lawyers tend to ex-
ploit those who lack their expertise, accountants
do not, or at least not always, then you are proba-
bly sympathetic to my overall stance on profes-
sions. In order to explain that stance, I want to
delve a little further into what it means to be a pro-
fession.
The term ‘profession’ is generally employed
quite loosely in everyday speech, often being used
to refer to any, or almost any, occupational group.
However, it has a narrower, more technical sense
when used by people like sociologists. Much of
the academic debate about professions has asked
what it means to be a profession and hence what
marks off professions from other occupational
groups (e.g. see Johnson, 1972; Taylor et al.,
1995). It is an interesting debate, but whatever def-
inition is invoked and however vague its bound-
aries, it is clear that accountancy qualifies as a pro-
fession. This can be appreciated by examining the
characteristics that tend to be associated with pro-
fessions or, rather, professional bodies. I think the
following list is a fair summary of the broad con-
sensus, even if is not the final word on the subject.7
• There is a widely agreed and extensive specialist
skill and knowledge base, the latter often of a
somewhat theoretical kind.
• The deployment of the knowledge base involves
the use of discretion and judgment, not just the
application of rules to routine circumstances.
• Acquisition of the requisite skill and knowledge
base involves a long period of training, with for-
mal certification of competence (usually involv-
ing written examinations) and, frequently, some
form of licence to practise.
• It enjoys independence and self-regulation, with
control over the knowledge base, setting of entry
standards and criteria for membership, and re-
sponsibility for the disciplining of members.
• In many cases, there are high levels of personal
and financial reward.
• There are ethical codes (often formal, but not ex-
clusively so), independent of contract or state
law, and these are self-enforced. These demand
more than conventional morality and law.
The final item contains a clear reference to
ethics, but it is worth considering why it is there. I
think the reason can be discerned in two of the
themes that appear in the list.
The first theme is expertise. It is not enough to
stipulate and examine the expert skills of profes-
sionals, for there is the question of what they then
178 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
3 It is a more concrete, ‘grounded’ starting point than, say,
philosophical ethics – though I will say a little about ethical
theory below when I sketch a position regarding professional
ethics.
4 The others are ‘payoff challenge’ and the ‘practical chal-
lenge’.
5 It might be contended that ‘major’ misdemeanours (how-
ever defined) are, or should be, a matter for the law. I do not
want to consider that question here though.
6 There was considerable laughter among the audience at
the lecture at this point, providing the opportunity for further
‘lawyer jokes’, which I have, perhaps wisely, chosen to omit
from this written version.
7 It might be better to view this list as being indications of
family resemblance (see Wittgenstein, 1958) rather than pro-
viding the basis for an essentialist definition. It, and the dis-
cussion in which it is located, draws on various sources,
particularly Abbott (1988), Davis (1997), De George (2006),
Jary and Jary (1991), Larson (1977), Parry and Parry (1976),
Reed (1992) and Taylor et al. (1995). See also Pierce (2006).
See also Lord Benson’s list of nine obligations to the public in
a 1992 House of Lords Debate (‘Criteria for a group to be con-
sidered a profession’ as recorded in Hansard (Lords), 8 July
1992, 1206–1207, quoted in BCS (2006)). I am grateful to
Michael Izza for pointing me to Lord Benson’s list.
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do with those high-level skills, how they use them.
Technical expertise puts the professional in a posi-
tion of power and provides opportunities for ex-
ploitation of the inexpert lay person, who is in a
weak position to reach a judgment on the quality
of service provided – and who may be vulnerable
in other ways too.8 The controlling of opportuni-
ties to take advantage of lay persons would appear
to make professional ethics publicly potentially
beneficial.9
The second theme is self-regulation. Holding it-
self to a higher standard of ethics than ordinarily
required by law and conventional morality (see
Davis, 1997; De George, 2006) can be viewed as a
promise that a profession makes to society, and the
reward for that promise is self-regulation. Or, to
put it the other way round, the promise of higher
standards of ethics is the price that a profession
pays for the privileges that it enjoys, which include
a degree of self-regulation. Self-regulation tends to
be jealously guarded, which suggests that it is
highly valued by professions. Accountants are no
exception in this regard.
These are two good reasons – among others – for
hoping for a high standard of ethics from profes-
sionals. However, the crucial question is: do 
professions live up to this vision of higher-than-
average ethics? According to many critics, at the
heart of the professional ‘project’ is the pursuit of
economic – and to some extent social – advantage.
In this view, professions are not about ethics at all.
Such critics seem to have at least some circum-
stantial evidence on their side for, as noted earlier,
one common feature of professions such as ac-
countancy is the superior earning power of their
members.
The essence of the argument of the critics is that
professional bodies seek to secure a privileged po-
sition in the market for their services. They control
entry into the profession itself, thus ensuring not
so much quality – which might appear a reason-
able justification – but restricted supply. Given the
demand for a profession’s services (which profes-
sional bodies also seek to stimulate), this tends to
increase remuneration to levels above what it
would otherwise be.
Thus not all observers are convinced that profes-
sions really do serve the public interest; quite the
contrary. For example, there have been sustained
Marxist and, more recently, consumerist critiques
of professions’ use of their privileged position to
their own advantage.10 The negative assessment of
professions – whatever the particular intellectual
form it might take – is that they are fundamentally
self-interested endeavours, and that claims to
ethics and serving the public interest are either a
‘smokescreen’ (Taylor et al., 1995) or, at best, a
misleading ‘sideshow’. The criticism is that the
rhetoric of ethics and public service is just that,
and no more.
How should we assess and respond to such crit-
icisms? The first step is to acknowledge what the
critics have got right. They point to a real risk that
professions, as we know them, tend to run.
However, the problem with such ‘totalising’ or
‘blanket’ views is that they leave no room for con-
sidering whether some professions, in some places
or circumstances, at some times, are less prone to
abusing their privileged position or, indeed, are of
significant public benefit – even if members con-
tinue to reap considerable rewards.11 While a
healthy scepticism might be called for, dismissing
professions tout court amounts to little more than
cynicism, which closes the door to productive pos-
sibilities. My contention is that the actual contribu-
tion of a particular profession is a contingent
matter, not an inevitability. If I am right that there
can indeed be variation in the social contribution
that professions make, to which ‘blanket views’
are inevitably blind, then it is worth considering
how that can occur, and how a positive contribu-
tion can be encouraged.
In a business-related profession (broadly con-
ceived), a positive impact can occur via two prin-
cipal routes. First, there is the external role as
provider of advice and services to clients. This is
the classic professional form which 19th century
Chartered Accountants saw in doctors and lawyers
and sought to emulate as they pursued profession-
al status (Macdonald, 1995). It is the site for the
provision of audit, which can make a positive con-
tribution to the quality of financial reporting and
hence to the operation of markets – but which, of
course, faces its own ethical challenges, particular-
ly (so some would argue) when the cross-selling of
non-audit services is involved. However, this is
not an issue I want to deal with directly, not least
because plenty has been said about it already (e.g.
Coffee, 2006; see Cowton, 2008). The principal
point is that accountants have the potential to
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 179
8 This is not just a question of the asymmetry in expertise
though; it is also because professionals tend to supply ‘cre-
dence goods’ (Darby and Karni, 1973), such as advice, the
quality of which is never apparent, or is apparent only after
much delay. 
9 Of course, one might respond with ‘caveat emptor’, but in
situations such as these the lay person would often have to rely
on a further professional to vouch for the work of the first,
which is both inefficient and, conceptually at least, subject to
infinite regress. It is probably sensible for the lay person to
keep ‘caveat emptor’ in mind, but it is of limited value here
when compared with many other, everyday transactions.
10 Perhaps there is also a wider challenge to ‘authority’ and
distrust of entities seeking to advance collective interests.
11 Luetge (2005) argues that critics of business have to move
beyond pre-modern ethics to recognise that, at the heart of
modern economic life, are non-zero sum games. Thus it is in-
sufficient and far from satisfactory, when launching an ethical
critique, to focus on the fact that one party gains from the sit-
uation. Mutual advantages should be recognised and assessed.
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make a positive contribution through working to
high ethical standards within the setting of a pro-
fessional firm.
The second route for accountants to have a pos-
itive impact is through their status as employees of
non-professional firms – ordinary businesses, in
the main, but also other sorts of organisations. If,
as noted earlier, professional accountants are sup-
posed to be following higher-than-average ethics,
one of the ways in which they can have an impact
is highlighted by the concept of organisational-
professional conflict (OPC). OPC is present when
there is a tension between what the employing or-
ganisation is demanding and what professional
ethics would require (Sorensen, 1967; see Brierley
and Cowton, 2000). If professional ethics domi-
nate, then they will have had a positive impact on
the ethical quality of organisational functioning.
Perhaps just as significantly, though, the position
of qualified accountants in many organisations
also means that they have the opportunity to influ-
ence the ethical tone or climate of the organisation
for the better, if they bring their professional ethics
to bear.12
Such moral leadership could have a positive im-
pact. However, it is not necessarily the case that
the contribution of qualified accountants to the
ethical climate of business, whether as an outsider
or as an employee, is in opposition to what those
in control would otherwise wish to do. Perhaps
being more than averagely ethical actually pays off
financially. Certainly there are those who want to
see business being more ethical and assert this
opinion with great regularity and confidence. I will
briefly review the evidence regarding this ‘payoff
challenge’ and develop what I hope is a helpful
perspective on it.
The payoff challenge
Many times when I talk to people about business
ethics, one of the first questions they ask is: does it
pay? Is there money in being moral? Can you do
well by doing good? Is there a ‘business case’ for
ethics? The question is posed in many forms, but
the same basic question is nevertheless posed.
At one level the speed and frequency with which
this question arises is quite depressing, but in de-
fence of some of the people who pose it, they are
not (necessarily) asking what’s in it for them but
are interested in promoting what they take to be
higher standards of behaviour. They think, quite
reasonably, that it will be easier to persuade people
to follow an ethically desirable course of action if
it can be shown that it is in their own interests to
do so. At the back of their mind is probably the as-
sumption that commercial life is tough – which it
can be – and that actions assumed to entail a finan-
cial sacrifice would not be seriously considered.
Perhaps they have in mind, too, a view of business
as purely profit-oriented, the implication of which
is that £1 of extra profit is worth the sacrifice of
any amount of ethics (cf. Hooker, 1998). Many
people take this to be well summed up in the words
of the late Nobel Prize-winning economist, Milton
Friedman (1970):
‘There is one and only one social responsibility
of business – to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is
to say, engages in open and free competition
without deception or fraud.’
It is perhaps ironic that Friedman has become
one of the most frequently quoted authors in busi-
ness ethics, where he is usually being presented as
a stalking horse – though often a misrepresented
stalking horse. I will not pursue a detailed analysis
of his position here. Rather, based partly on my
perception of ‘Friedman-abuse’, I will highlight a
few points to indicate the inherent weaknesses in
the view that Friedman rules out business ethics.
• Friedman was not referring to owner-managed
or closely-held businesses such as private com-
panies or partnerships. He explicitly states this,
and yet some writing on the ethics of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) implies that
he thought they have to be focused purely on
profitability. Friedman clearly said that if owner-
managers wish to indulge their particular ethical
interests or social agenda through their business,
that is their choice. What concerned Friedman
was executives in publicly listed corporations
not pursuing the interests of shareholders, which
he took to be increasing profits and hence divi-
dends and/or capital gains. We might note that
he was writing before the advent of a noticeable
contingent of ethical investors, but I will leave
this particular interest of mine on one side
here.13 My point is that there is a large part of the
business sector which is not, subject to the need
to survive, caught on the horns of any ethics 
versus profits dilemma. Many accountants ad-
vise, or work in, these businesses, and it would
be wrong to presume that they are all focused 
exclusively on making money. The weight ac-
corded to profits in the objective function of
such businesses is a contingent matter, not one
determined by institutional form.
• Many parts of our economy are not constituted
as for-profit businesses. Of course, Friedman
never said otherwise – though he was not in
favour of an extensive public sector. My point
here is that an ethical agenda fits very naturally
180 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
12 A further potential contribution, in relation to the ‘busi-
ness case’ for ethics, will be discussed below.
13 See, for example, Cowton (1994, 1997a, 1999).
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with the operations of many organisations with
or for which accountants work, and as public and
voluntary organisations are encouraged to be
more ‘business-like’, I think it would be wrong
to suppose that this has to drive out ethics: far
from it, if they are to be properly managed and
to meet their legitimate objectives.
When put this way, it is obvious that, in a large
swathe of organisational activity, ethics simply
does not have to give way to making money all the
time. However, this is often neglected in debates
about the ethics of accounting and the ethics of or-
ganisations, where such realms tend to be forgot-
ten. It is important that we remember to think
about ethical issues related to accounting and how
they might play out in these contexts too.
• Nevertheless, publicly listed companies, with a
divorce of ownership and control, are very im-
portant. Does a Friedmanite position require that
such businesses are ‘red in tooth and claw’,
seeking to subjugate or compromise on ethics all
the time in the pursuit of profits, subject only to
the constraints of law.14 The simple answer to
this is that they do not; and the simple reason is
that, if ethics pays, managers should choose the
ethical option. If it pays, a Friedmanite would
have no objections.
So does taking the ethical option pay? There has
been plenty of research over more than 30 years
into this question (Margolis and Walsh, 2003;
Orlitsky et al., 2003), but the results are not whol-
ly conclusive – or so it might seem. There are var-
ious reasons for this. If I depict the question in the
simple form:
E→P?
which should be read as asking whether being eth-
ical leads to superior financial performance, I can
begin to indicate some of the reasons that make the
question so difficult to answer empirically. I will
deal with the expression from right to left.15
First, how should we conceptualise and measure
P? This might seem relatively straightforward, but
anyone with a knowledge of accounting and fi-
nance will quickly realise that it poses certain chal-
lenges. For example, if we focus on profits, we
have the difficulty of deciding on the appropriate
form of profitability16 and the relevant time span:
too short, and we might miss some impact, too
long and we might lose any statistically discernible
effect in a lot of noise, in spite of our attempts to
control for other variables. For publicly listed
companies, at least, we might look for an impact
on share prices, but if the financial benefits of an
ethical stance are recognised by the stock market,
they will be impounded in share prices at the point
of recognition, not over the years that the stance is
actually implemented. Yet many studies examine
periods during which a particular company’s ‘su-
perior’ ethical stance will have been constant.
Second, what sort of link (→) should we look
for? Many studies (and, implicitly, anecdotal ex-
amples) have used correlation, but if we rely on
correlation, how can we be sure that we have
found a link in the direction indicated? Correlation
is not causation, and some studies find a positive
link the other way; namely, increased financial
performance tends to lead to more ethical behav-
iour. Together with other findings, this suggests
the possibility of a ‘virtuous circle’ (Orlitsky et al.,
2003).17
Third, and perhaps most challenging, how
should we conceptualise and measure E (see Wood
and Jones, 1995)? Bear in mind that we are inter-
ested in some companies being more ethical than
others and whether that confers any competitive
advantage. The research question is therefore con-
cerned with relative rather than absolute ‘ethical
performance’. More important, ‘ethics’ seems to
encompass so many possible dimensions – volun-
tary pollution control expenditure, keeping deliv-
ery promises, paying suppliers on time, honest
advertising, charitable donations, progressive em-
ployment policies, to name just a few – and its
basis, as well as its content, seem to be subject to
so many different opinions. Not surprisingly, dif-
ferent researchers take different approaches. Some
focus on particular dimensions, which sacrifices
generalisability of findings regarding the question
of whether ethics pays in favour of tractability (as
well as expressing an interest in particular issues).
Others attempt to capture a broader concept of
ethics, perhaps even using a general reputational
measure. However, what should enter such a con-
struct, and what weights should be attached to the
various components, is a moot point; and the
chances of finding something both significant and
useful are thereby limited.
The conceptual and methodological challenges
in undertaking such research are formidable and its
results therefore prone to contestation. Many re-
searchers think they have found a positive link
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 181
14 Note, though, that some businesses might choose to break
the law in the interests of profitability, depending on the prob-
ability and consequences of being caught. This point is cov-
ered by Wagner-Tsukamoto (2008) in an exploration of
different approaches to business ethics through his ‘rationali-
ty-of-ends/market-structure grid’.
15 Much of the literature in this area uses the abbreviations
CSP (corporate social performance) and CFP (corporate finan-
cial performance). Because of the focus of this paper on pro-
fessional ethics, to which I will be explicitly returning below,
I employ a more generalised form.
16 As well as the issue of the reliability of disclosed profit
figures, of course.
17 Of 127 studies reviewed by Margolis and Walsh (2003),
109 examined E→P and 22 P→E (i.e. four examined both).
Support for a positive relationship was found by the majority
of studies in both cases.
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from ethics to financial performance, but some do
not find any such link. Some even find a negative
one. The results are described as ‘inconclusive’ by
Jones and Wicks (1999: 112) and ‘very mixed’ by
McWilliams and Siegel (2001). Yet from their re-
view of 127 studies, Margolis and Walsh (2003)
were able to conclude that the balance of evidence
is in favour of a positive link. Moreover, from their
meta-analysis18 of 52 previous studies, Orlitsky et
al. (2003) were able to suggest that corporate re-
sponsibility and, to a lesser extent, environmental
responsibility, is likely to pay off.
Thus there are suggestions, with some support-
ing evidence, that being ethical pays. Even if the
evidence in favour is not conclusive, the findings
certainly imply that it would be wrong to think that
being ethical never pays. To put it colloquially,
sometimes the good guys finish first, or at least in
the medal positions; sometimes the bad guys do.
Perhaps the problem is that the question is actu-
ally not a particularly sensible one to tackle empir-
ically, certainly not at the level of generality at
which it is typically posed, and which I have gone
along with for the purposes of this argument.
Asking whether ethics pays is a bit like asking
whether marketing pays, or whether management
accounting does. The terms cover such a vast
range of practices (‘ethics’ even more so), and the
value of those practices is going to depend on the
situation and how they are carried out. Thus, I
would contend, the question is really the starting
point for a research agenda but not a serious re-
search question in isolation.
Much more could be said about that research
agenda, but for present purposes I would prefer to
draw what I think is a strong practical conclusion
from this possibly inconclusive body of empirical
research: namely, that ethical initiatives in busi-
ness should not be rejected automatically, without
thought, even if the business concerned happens to
be focused exclusively on making money. I think
that this kind of ‘ruling out’ by business people
might actually be quite common, eliminating the
consideration of certain actions rather than taking
them seriously; a kind of prejudice,19 if you like.
Managers often tend to view themselves as more
constrained than they really are, and the assump-
tion that a more ethical stance would involve fi-
nancial sacrifice is fairly widespread – hence the
clear desire of some empirical researchers to prove
otherwise. Accountants in business have an impor-
tant role to play here, because if they also make
this kind of assumption, if they fail to look for and
quantify, or at least mention, the financial benefits
that an ethically desirable course of action might
generate, then the win-win opportunity will be
missed. 
Because there are many dimensions to what it
might mean for a business to be ethical, there are
many ways in which a positive link might occur
between ethics and profitability. Many writers
focus on the top line effects on revenue that result
from customers appreciating what the business is
doing or how it does it, but there are also possible
cost advantages. One of the crucial aspects that
many people have remarked upon is how an ethi-
cal approach leads to a good reputation, which in
turn leads to trust on the part of various stakehold-
ers, and this can bring about things like improved
sales, lower employee turnover or better terms
from suppliers.
Furthermore, we should not forget that sound
ethics which lead to trust have also been identified
as of great benefit for the economy as a whole.
Money might make the world go round, but one of
the things that has been learnt from watching
emerging economies is that trust makes it go round
far better. We know ethics pays at the macro level,
promoting healthy markets. This is an area where
the accountancy profession can make a significant
contribution, in all sorts of economies; which
brings me back to the question of the profession,
rather than the individual business.
Issues of trust and reputation are also important
at the level of the profession, for it is reputation
that is the key to the rewards it receives and trust
that is critical to the self-regulation it enjoys. As
many businesses have recognised, a good reputa-
tion can be thought of as an intangible asset, and
like all assets it is at risk of impairment. This im-
pairment may not always be accidental. It is not
difficult to show that the self-interested develop-
ment of a good reputation on the part of an individ-
ual actor – such as a business – is potentially
unstable and subject to the risk of being deliberate-
ly depleted in what I would term ‘marginal’ situa-
tions, for example, where survival is at stake or a
decision has already been taken to exit. In other
words, a choice might be taken to exploit the trust
that has been built up, to liquidate or ‘cash in’ the
reputational capital when there is insufficient in-
centive to maintain it. I think this is less of a risk
with a professional body than with, say, a small
business, but there is nevertheless a significant
‘cashing in’ risk. That comes about because of the
way in which a professional body’s reputation
works.
Individual members gain from the professional
body’s reputation, particularly if their own individ-
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18 Meta-analysis is a quantitative review method used to re-
evaluate the relationship between variables across existing
studies (see, e.g. Brierley and Cowton, 2000). A major advan-
tage over narrative reviews is its power to provide for more
valid inferences when conflicting results observed between
small sample studies arise from statistical artefacts such as
sampling error and measurement error – two concerns ex-
pressed about this particular tradition of research (Ullmann,
1985; Waddock and Graves, 1997).
19 i.e. prejudging.
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ual ‘brand’ – if I might put it that way – is not well
known. They are qualified accountants able to use
particular designatory letters, and that provides
valuable signals in the marketplace including, if
the professional body has got things right, the stan-
dard of behaviour that can be expected from the in-
dividual member. There is a sense in which the
professional body’s reputation is lent out or en-
trusted to members, to the individual member’s
advantage. When a member acts correctly, which
will usually be the case, that reputation is main-
tained and perhaps even enhanced a little. But
when the member acts wrongly, the professional
body’s reputation is damaged – usually in a small
way, but sometimes in a big way. A member might
be happy to use the reputation of the professional
body responsibly much of the time. However, in
certain situations they might put that reputation,
which they have done little or nothing to create or
develop, at significant risk, seeking to ‘cash in’
some of it in their own interests. That is one way
in which you can read many of the disciplinary
cases on professional bodies’ websites, where a
member has exploited the trust which his or her
qualification has engendered on the part of a client
or employer. The question is: how can such misbe-
haviour be discouraged, and how can ethical be-
haviour be encouraged? This is the ‘practical
challenge’ to which I now turn.
The practical challenge
As I turn to the practical challenge (or part of it, at
least) of influencing professions to be ethical, I
want to look at codes of ethics for two principal
reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, they are an ex-
pected feature of professions, and professional ac-
counting bodies have recently been re-visiting this
topic, following the promulgation of the IFAC
code.20 A code is a key aspect of professional ac-
countancy bodies’ ethics offering. Second, codes
have also become one of the most visible features
of ethics in business21 and have accordingly at-
tracted the interest of business ethics researchers.
Therefore, rather than provide a critique of a par-
ticular accounting code, I will, in keeping with the
level of argument of this paper and in order to
make my comments relevant to the organisations
in which accountants work as well as the body to
which they belong, instead look at what we can
learn from the research on codes in general.
Given what I said earlier about whether ethics
leads to improved financial performance, it is not
surprising that it is difficult to draw firm, detailed
conclusions about the positive impact of codes of
ethics from the empirical research literature. This
might seem to accord with the views of sceptics
like Warren (1993), who condemns codes as ‘su-
perficial and distracting answers to the question of
how to promote ethical behaviour in corporate life’
(p. 186). On a little reflection, mixed results might
indeed be expected. Codes vary from company to
company in their intentions and content. It is one
thing to identify that a company has a code; it is a
rather different matter to judge that the code is a
good one. Furthermore, beyond what it says, there
is the vital question of how (or even whether) the
code is implemented. To research the impact of
codes therefore requires considerable sophistica-
tion and a large volume of research to cope with all
the complexity. We do not yet have sufficient,
high-quality empirical studies to provide a com-
prehensive evidence base, and possibly never will.
Nevertheless, there are some useful insights and
some sensible advice available (e.g. Webley and
Werner, 2008). For example, some writers have
drawn attention to the importance of the ‘tone
from the top’. This isn’t just leaders of the business
(or profession) occasionally remembering to men-
tion the ethics code, though that helps. Rather, it is
that everything that is said is consistent with what
the code of ethics states.
One of the crucial things when drawing up a
code is to get the balance of rules and principles
right. Principles alone too easily look like vague
moral exhortation. They will be viewed sceptical-
ly by outsiders and will be of limited practical help
to those to whom the code is intended to apply.
Detailed rules are needed, therefore, to put some
flesh on the bones of the principles, providing
practical guidance for the most common issues and
situations that are likely to be met. However, it
should be recognised that the rules cannot cover all
eventualities, and ambiguities will remain (Page
and Spira, 2005). That is clearly the case for a pro-
fessional code intended to apply to members in a
wide variety of settings, even if some attempt is
made to explore various possible contexts. There
will always be gaps, which is why the principles
have to be emphasised, in the hope of preventing
the unscrupulous from treating those gaps as loop-
holes. The rules are then expressions of the expect-
ed consequences of the principles in some
anticipated situations, but the responsibility of the
person to whom the code applies is to give effect
to the principles. The focus on principles-based in-
tegrity, as discussed in Reporting with Integrity
(ICAEW, 2007), not just rules-based compliance,
is therefore quite right.22
That’s the theory, or good advice at least. It is
important to attempt to avoid legalism or moral
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 183
20 International Federation of Accountants – see http://
www. i fac .o rg /Members /Pubs-Deta i l s . tmpl?PubID
=10456070402914590&Category=Ethics.
21 Some companies, though, prefer not to use the term ‘code
of ethics’. They might, for example, refer to their ‘code of con-
duct’ or use some other such term.
22 This line of thinking will be familiar to accountants from
the substance-over-form debate in financial reporting.
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‘dumbing down’, a defensive or unthinking adher-
ence to the rules, which – amongst other things –
would amount to de-professionalisation, if you re-
call the earlier point about professionals not sim-
ply applying formulae. In this regard, one of the
encouraging things that emerged from my discus-
sions with qualified accountants was that they eas-
ily recognised, indeed tended to bring up, the
distinction between principles and rules. I think it
fair to say that they supported the idea of putting
principles first. However, they also thought that,
whatever a code or those promoting it might say,
they were under great pressure to pay attention to
the letter of the rules and found it difficult to gain
much leverage from the principles, although there
was a suggestion that this might apply less to
members in business, who are under less threat of
litigation.
Another relevant factor regarding the rules ver-
sus principles issue is that there is some research
evidence to suggest that accountants have a rela-
tively strong preference for rules, which – if true –
would tend to put them at one of the lower stages
of moral development.23 Not all accountants are
like this, of course, but it might be a tendency,
which would tend to increase the risk of failing to
follow the spirit of the code. 
Another interesting perspective, voiced by some
of the accountants that I talked to during the prepa-
ration of this lecture, was that the growth of other
regulations and codes was diminishing the signifi-
cance of any accounting ethics code for their day-
to-day professional experience. The extent to
which this is the case will vary from industry to in-
dustry – financial services are relatively heavily
regulated, for example, but you can see the poten-
tial impact of what some business commentators
have referred to as ‘code overload’.
Some people – correctly – point out that a code
does not stop bad things happening. For such peo-
ple, the presence of an apparently excellent code at
Enron is some sort of proof that codes are a waste
of time. But a code itself cannot stop someone
breaking it, no more than a law ensures that the be-
haviour legislated against never happens again.
This comparison with the law makes it unsurpris-
ing that one thing research has suggested is that
there should be enforcement mechanisms to dis-
courage the code being broken and to reassure oth-
ers to whom it applies and outsiders that it is taken
seriously by the body to which it belongs
(Molander, 1987). But in the final analysis, the only
way to ensure that codes – or indeed laws – are not
broken, is not to have them in the first place!
Of course, codes of ethics are not the same as
law. Some of the reasons for this are obvious, but
there is one important respect in which they differ
that is easily missed in discussions of professional
ethics. It was argued earlier that professional
ethics should be above and beyond what law and
ordinary morality demand; this is certainly the
claim of professional accounting bodies. However,
this sets up a tension regarding enforcement, in re-
lation to the disciplining of members. First, in
practice, many disciplinary cases seem to involve
the sanctioning of members who have already
been found guilty of a criminal offence; this is a
necessary ‘tidying up’ operation for a professional
body to engage in, but it is of limited significance
for the maintenance of professional ethics.
Second, of the remaining cases, how many are
about an alleged failure to observe high standards
of professional ethics? I would suggest that very
few, if any, are. Instead, they are focused on lower
level breaches. Of course, this is only to be expect-
ed, for all sorts of practical reasons. My point is
not that a large proportion of the profession should
be subject to formal disciplinary procedures, but
rather that – given the importance of enforcement
mechanisms – there is a natural limit on the degree
to which codes of ethics can drive high standards
of behaviour. They are better suited to dealing with
ethical shortcomings than to raising aspirations –
though that does not mean that they should not
have aspirational content.
Perhaps this seems a little negative, but I would
not agree with those critics who say that codes are
always a complete waste of time – or worse.
Perhaps some company ethics codes are little more
than PR, published as a knee-jerk reaction to some
bad publicity or a pressing issue and then forgotten
about. But sometimes they are rather more useful.
In this I am echoing my earlier comments about
the nature of professions; I am seeking to avoid a
negative generalisation that then neglects and in-
deed suppresses any potential a code might have.
And in the final analysis, I think it difficult to
argue that a profession should not have a code at
all.
Some people might point out that, traditionally,
no attempt was made to codify ethics in written
form at all, yet ethics was not absent. It was pure-
ly an oral tradition, built into the culture. In the re-
search I conducted prior to this lecture, some of
the accountants talked about how they ‘just know’
what they are supposed to do. But they were high-
ly experienced members and, as they acknowl-
edged, entered the profession in different
circumstances from those that gain that status
today. In any case, if properly used, a code does
not necessarily undermine a culture.24 In fact, it
184 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
23 A clear outline of Kohlberg’s theory of moral develop-
ment can be found in the Reporting with Integrity paper. For
relevant research results, see Lampe (1996), Ponemon (1990)
and Shaub (1994); though cf. Fulmer & Cargile (1987), Green
and Weber (1997) and Jeffrey (1993).
24 See Moore (2006) for a perspective on the risks involved
though.
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can be used to express it, or at least something
about it, both to outsiders so that they have some
sense of what to expect, and to insiders – especial-
ly new recruits. This is particularly important now
that business is so international and entrants to the
profession come from increasingly diverse back-
grounds. What some recruits ‘just know’ might be
very different from what established members of
the profession hope they will think, and a code can
provide useful explicit guidance, even if it is only
a start. In this day and age, a code might be neces-
sary – but, of course, it could hardly be sufficient
(Webley and Werner, 2008), and not too much
should be expected of it, even while it is being
treated with appropriate seriousness. It’s the same
with any tool used in isolation when seeking to in-
fluence something as complex as human behav-
iour in the large. If we are to be practical about
ethics, if we are to take it seriously, we have to do
many different things. Ethics – good or bad – is at
its most powerful when it is just part of the way
you do things, part of the culture, part of the way
qualified accountants think. Tools can help support
this, but they cannot really replace it.
However, what should be the content of ethics?
If we are to be practical, should we not specify
what we mean by being ethical? Earlier, I stated
that I wanted to keep my ‘preaching’ to a mini-
mum, and I do not wish to launch into an attempt
to lay out a scheme of ethics for accounting. I will
do so by outlining a way of thinking about ethics.
Let me change the subject (apparently) to terri-
tory in which accountants will find themselves
more at ease. What is 2 + 2? I hope you will imme-
diately think ‘4’. How or why do we know that 
2 + 2 = 4, though? I would suggest it is because we
have joined a community of practice, the commu-
nity of practitioners of arithmetic. We have learnt
the rules, become competent practitioners of them,
been imbued with them to such an extent that the
answer is obvious and in need of no justification.
Some philosophers who have wrestled with the na-
ture of ethics have suggested ethical knowledge is
rather like this, and I think it has a lot to be said for
it. We join a moral community, albeit one that
through engagement within itself and with those
around might come to evolve its rules over time. If
one metaphor for ethics is taking fundamental
truths as a foundation and building a sturdy struc-
ture on top of that foundation (but these days wor-
rying that we don’t know what the foundations
should be or won’t agree on them), the metaphor
here might be the idea of joining a boat afloat on
the seas, which undergoes a continual process of
maintenance and, sometimes, change: a boat that is
made both for us and by us. I hope you don’t get
the wrong impression here though: a moral com-
munity is not a club for talking ethics. Moral com-
munities do things, real things, but they share
ethical ‘software’.25
This notion of a moral community, and the idea
of a profession as a moral community, fits well
with the idea of becoming competent practitioners
of what a code of ethics stands for, of ‘just know-
ing’ what the principles mean in the situation in
which you find yourself – even if in the early days
you had to follow the rules in a more mechanical
fashion. As I said earlier, though, professions vary
in the extent to which they seek to meet seriously
the standing ethics challenge that they face. And so
it follows that the degree to which they are an ef-
fective moral community will vary. It is particular-
ly challenging for large, diverse associations such
as many of the professional accounting bodies;
members come from, or work in, different cul-
tures, and they undertake a large variety of roles,
with the ‘practice/industry’ split being a very sig-
nificant one.26 One way of thinking about this is to
look at the various tools available, but I have al-
ready looked at one principal tool, a code of ethics,
and made some comments on that.
Instead, in the time remaining I want to take a
slightly different tack. I will identify three versions
of a professional body (there may be more) which
can be seen to reflect various strands of the preced-
ing discussion. These are general models.27 I am
not saying that any particular professional body is
exactly like this; I am referring to possibilities and
tendencies.
Version 1: the qualification professional body
This professional body does little more than act as
an examining institution. It is responsible for test-
ing students and certifying their knowledge. It
might have ethics in the exam syllabus – indeed it
should – but on its own this will have limited im-
pact and will do little or nothing to build a moral
community, though there may be other helpful
processes going on during training, depending on
how it is organised. To be a member is to be little
more than just someone who holds a qualification. 
Version 2: the customer-focused professional body
This professional body has a more sustained rela-
tionship with those who have qualified with it. It
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 185
25 The way of thinking about ethics being obliquely referred
to here can be associated with the work of writers like John
McDowell (1981, 1983), drawing on Wittgenstein’s rule-fol-
lowing considerations (see Wittgenstein, 1958). McDowell is
(in part) responding to philosophers such as Mackie (1977) who
in various ways (‘error theory’, in the case of Mackie) seek to
undermine ‘realist’ conceptions that attempt to ground ethics in
something (for want of a better word) solid. McNaughton
(1988) contains an excellent review of this meta-ethics debate.
Although he might be viewed as a (modern) realist by some, it
would be better to see McDowell as an anti-anti-realist.
26 This came up quickly and frequently in the roundtable
discussions I held while preparing the lecture.
27 Or ‘ideal types’ in the Weberian sense.
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continues to provide them with benefits, for which
they pay their annual subscription. These benefits
might include the borrowing of the professional
body’s reputation through the use of designatory
letters and other signs of professional competence
and trustworthiness, as discussed earlier, but it will
also include services. In this case the members are
seen as customers. Because of the professional
success of accountants in the UK (Armstrong,
1987; Matthews et al., 1998), several of the UK-
based professional accounting bodies are large or-
ganisations. This enables them to exploit
economies of scale. However, with impressive size
comes a varied membership performing many dif-
ferent roles, and hence the challenge of providing
a sufficient range of services to meet members’
needs and expectations.
Viewing our relationship with an organisation to
which we pay money as a transactional one is a fa-
miliar one. Many members no doubt wonder about
whether the annual subscription is worth it, and
professional body staff worry about whether
enough is provided to such members to coax them
to continue to part with their money. If such mem-
bers think of themselves as customers, then it is
not a bad idea for professional body staff to think
of them that way too. ‘What do we provide to
members in public practice? What do we provide
to members in business? What do we provide to
members who never come to HQ?’ These, and oth-
ers, are sensible questions to ask.
However, I think this ‘member as customer’ no-
tion has corrosive effects if it becomes too domi-
nant. Some people even suggest it is not the best
way of running a conventional business; your cus-
tomers have to be more than customers, they say.
The problem is that the notion of customer is apt to
reduce everything to a question of transactions,
and this tends to drive out any notion of relation-
ship.28 What scope for moral community then?
This brings me to my third version.
Version 3: the ‘membered’ professional body
The third version goes beyond the idea of the
member as customer and finds its way back to the
roots of the word ‘member’ and, indeed, ‘body’, as
in ‘professional body’. We often forget about this
in everyday usage, but just think what a member
is: it is a limb or, by extension, part of a body. We
still use it in that sense when we talk about ‘dis-
membering’. A member is joined in, indeed joint-
ed in. A professional body, like any body, is made
up of its members. This version of a professional
body is the one that can best carry the idea of a
profession being a moral community. At one level
then, my principal proposal for meeting the ethics
challenge faced by professional bodies is simply:
‘Re-member the professional body.’
It’s certainly an easy slogan to recall. What it
points towards is the need to keep in view what it
means to be a member of a professional body as a
moral community – hopefully a well-functioning
one. 
So to recap. What does it mean to be a qualified
accountant, to be a member of a professional
body? Is it someone who has passed the exams and
can use the designatory letters as a passport to a
well paid and rewarding career (see Version 1)?
Yes, but it is more than that. Is it someone who
continues to pay the annual subscription because
they value what they get out of their professional
body (see Version 2)? Yes, but it is more than that,
I hope, and it needs to be more than that if mem-
bers are to develop some form of shared culture.
Members should have their own fleshed-out view
of what it means for them to be a qualified ac-
countant. That will include in their natural place,
not as an add-on, a whole lot of things that the
member ‘just knows’ when it comes to matters re-
lated to professional ethics, and hopefully those
things will bear a strong resemblance to what other
members ‘just know’.
So my position is that, while we don’t forget
ethics as something to focus on for special atten-
tion, we make sure that it is one part of a well-
rounded notion of what it means to be a member of
a professional body. Although I am not attempting
to spell out a practical programme of action to ac-
complish this, one way of taking this agenda for-
ward a little is to think about how people join,
participate in and perhaps fail – and therefore need
to be disciplined by or even expelled from – that
community. 
So, for example, what are the messages given to
potential students – or ‘junior members’, as we
might think of them – in the recruitment material
that is provided to them? They know that many
qualified accountants make lots of money. Perhaps
they think the work, especially in the early days,
will be dull and involve lots of hard study; but they
are willing to put up with that for the prospect of
the money – and we can try to tell them that it re-
ally can be fun. But what else do we tell them?
What other messages do we give them about what
it means to be a qualified accountant, a member of
a particular professional body?29
And once they have qualified – having studied
some ethics, of course – what do we expect of
them? To keep up to date, technically, in their area
of specialism and to pay their annual subscription?
Of course. But what about their participation in the
186 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
28 I explore these ideas further in the context of universities,
as a response to the Tomorrow’s Company report, in Cowton
(1997b).
29 I am not saying that professional bodies, in their materi-
al, say nothing of value regarding the responsibilities of qual-
ified accountants. I am merely raising the issue for attention
and reflection.
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body, in the moral community, which entails both
their further integration into it and their contribu-
tion to it? Of course, it is difficult to get busy
members to participate in activities and local soci-
eties do not appeal to all, as many professional
bodies know. What we need is plenty of different
ways for members to participate and interact, and
no doubt professional bodies’ staff give lots of
thought to this.30
As something of an outsider, I would not wish to
claim any special insights and come up with a list
of naïve proposals about professional participa-
tion, but I would like to mention one possibility for
consideration. Many professional bodies distin-
guish between different levels of membership,
with UK accountancy bodies offering both ‘asso-
ciate’ and ‘fellow’ status, with appropriate desig-
natory letters available. What should you have to
do to be up-graded to ‘fellow’. Different models
are possible: serving so much time, without getting
into trouble, and then paying a higher fee; proving
that you have been operating at a certain level of
responsibility; or perhaps even writing some sort
of thesis. But note the difference between the
words ‘associate’ and ‘fellow’. The latter sounds
much more joined in, part of things, a ‘real mem-
ber’. Perhaps before an associate becomes a fel-
low, the question ought to be asked: how does this
person engage with the professional body beyond
paying their subscription? Are they more than
merely ‘associated’ with it? I raise the issue both
because of the difference in what the words ‘asso-
ciate’ and ‘ fellow’ connote in everyday usage and
because it seems to be one of the few opportunities
or levers available for addressing the part that in-
dividual members play in the professional (moral)
community.
Finally, talking of levers, there is the question of
the disciplining of those who fail the community –
possibly even to the point of expulsion from it,
thus severing the offending member from the
body. Again, space precludes me from attempting
a detailed critique of what professional accounting
bodies do on this front, though I would note two
things. First, as mentioned earlier, research on
codes of ethics suggests enforcement mechanisms
are important. Second, and again as mentioned
earlier, it is worth reviewing disciplinary cases to
see where professional bodies are exerting some
pressure and where they might be failing to do so.
I think we can, from the ‘higher-than-average’ pro-
fessional ethics point of view, treat those cases
which concern the disciplining of members who
have been found guilty of breaking the law as of
marginal interest. The question is: what are the
other cases about, and what is missing? For exam-
ple, if there is an apparently disproportionate num-
ber of cases dealing with members from public
practice rather than business, what is the signifi-
cance of this? Ending my exposition on discipli-
nary issues might appear to strike a negative note,
but if the ethical pronouncements of professional
bodies do not come to be reflected in their discipli-
nary activities, how seriously are external ob-
servers likely to take those pronouncements?
Conclusion
In seeking to explore the nature of the ‘ethics chal-
lenge’ facing accountants, I have broken it down
into three subsidiary challenges; the professional
challenge, the payoff challenge, and the practical
challenge. Two issues addressed under the second
and third challenges – whether being ethical pays
and how useful codes of ethics are – played a dual
role in the exposition of the paper: they are rele-
vant to the organisations, especially businesses, in
or for which many accountants work; and they are
also relevant, to a greater or lesser extent, to pro-
fessional bodies themselves.
I began the main part of my analysis by looking
at the notion of a profession. I suggested that pro-
fessions can vary in the degree to which they serve
the public interest by being ethical. Implicit in
what I have been saying are two very simple mod-
els linking those three elements of profession,
ethics and rewards (especially financial).
1. A profession is a valuable technical and ethical
endeavour and therefore deserves its consider-
able rewards.
2. A profession is a successful conspiracy against
society and seeks to justify its considerable re-
wards through a smokescreen of ethics.
The challenge for professional accountancy bod-
ies, or at least those persons who would seek to in-
fluence them, from within or without, is to ensure
that they fall squarely within the former and do not
drift into the latter.
So what are the prospects for successfully fol-
lowing model 1 on a consistent basis? It is easy to
be cynical. Certainly the challenges are always
there and human behaviour and motivations are, as
ever, somewhat mixed. My overall view is that the
prospects are mixed too. There will always be
members who fail to live up to professional stan-
dards. But it is the fact that they are seen to have
fallen short that shows that there is an understand-
ing that standards exist and should prevail.
Moreover, there will from time to time be failures
that, for one reason or another, take on the status of
‘scandals’, and the profession will have to deal
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 187
30 The lecture and subsequent reception was, in its way, an
example of such interaction. Every ICAEW member who at-
tended therefore deserves some credit, not just for listening to
my ponderings but for being there in the first place, for doing
more than simply paying the annual subscription and – hope-
fully – staying out of trouble.
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with their consequences.
Professional ethics, in general, and accounting
ethics, in particular, will never be perfect.
However, if failures are no longer seen as failures
but as ‘par for the course’, if you think that talk of
professional ethics is a nonsense – as the ‘blanket’
condemnations referred to earlier would tend to
encourage – then you end up in a worse position
than if you try and only partially succeed. As long
as professions and professional bodies exist there
should be a creative tension between what they are
and what they should be; the real problem is when
there is no tension but just a gap that no-one wants,
or feels able, to do anything about.
Many of the things that the accountancy profes-
sion is doing now – such as codes of ethics, the
ICAEW’s Reporting with Integrity paper, the cov-
erage of ethical matters in examinations – are to be
applauded. On their own, they can perhaps achieve
relatively little – certainly it would be wrong to ex-
pect too much of them in isolation. However,
taken together and in the context of ‘re-membering
the professional body’ they have the potential to
help build a decent moral community. The real eth-
ical failure would be not to try to do anything, or
to pretend to try and not take it seriously. Ethics is
a serious business,31 and so are professions.
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